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  1Domestic entry, international trade cost reduction and welfare 
By 
Sugata Marjit and Arijit Mukherjee 
 
Abstract: 
We show the welfare effects of international trade cost reduction under endogenous domestic 
market structure. If the domestic labour market is competitive, there is no integer constraint and the 
trade cost represents transportation cost, a reduction in the transportation cost does not affect (may 
reduce) domestic welfare if the products are perfect (imperfect) substitutes. If the trade cost 
represents tariff, domestic welfare is higher under a positive non-prohibitive tariff compared to both 
free trade and no trade. In the presence of an integer constraint, a lower transportation cost may 
reduce consumer surplus and increase the profits of the active domestic firms and domestic welfare, 
even if the products are homogeneous. If there is no integer (integer) constraint and the products are 
perfect substitutes, transportation cost reduction reduces (may increase) domestic welfare in the 
presence of a domestic labour union. We also show that entry for the domestic country may be 
socially excessive or insufficient under a competitive domestic labour market, while it is always 
socially insufficient in the presence of a domestic labour union.  
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Non-Technical Summary 
 
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it shows the effects of trade cost reduction on domestic welfare 
under free entry of domestic firms. Second, it shows social efficiency of entry in the domestic country. In other 
words, it shows whether domestic anti-competitive entry regulation policy is justified in the presence of foreign 
competition.  
 
The first motivation of this paper comes from the observation that international trade costs are falling 
significantly in recent years, either due to policy decisions or technological improvements. Although it is 
intuitive that a trade cost reduction creates important welfare implications, the existing literature is restrictive in 
addressing this issue due to its focus on a given market structure and competitive labour market. Hence, the 
literature so far mainly shows the short-run effects of trade cost reduction by ignoring market entry. In contrast, 
we show a more long-run effect of trade cost reduction by considering the effects of trade cost on the entry of 
domestic firms. We analyze this issue under perfectly competitive and imperfectly competitive domestic labour 
markets, where imperfection in the input market is due to the presence of a domestic labour union.  
 
The consideration of free entry of domestic firms gives us the second motivation of the paper. It is well-known 
that free entry with scale economies is socially excessive in the oligopolistic markets, and this result is often 
referred as the “excess-entry” theorem. Although the literature examining social efficiency of free entry is quite 
large and has provided several important insights, the literature has mainly focused on closed economies. 
However, in this era of globalization, it is fair to say that the policy makers should also take into account the 
effect of foreign competition while designing competition policies. This limitation of the excess-entry literature 
motivates us to examine social efficiency of domestic entry in the presence of foreign competition, under both 
competitive and imperfectly competitive domestic input markets. 
 
 1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it shows the effects of trade cost reduction on domestic 
welfare under free entry of domestic firms. Second, it shows social efficiency of entry in the 
domestic country. In other words, it shows whether domestic anti-competitive entry regulation 
policy is justified in the presence of foreign competition. We analyze these issues under perfectly 
competitive and imperfectly competitive domestic labour markets, where imperfection in the input 
market is due to the presence of a domestic labour union.  
The first motivation of this paper comes from the observation that international trade costs 
are falling significantly in recent years, either due to policy decisions or technological 
improvements. Although it is intuitive that a trade cost reduction creates important welfare 
implications, the existing literature is restrictive in addressing this issue due to its focus on a given 
market structure and competitive labour market.
1 Hence, the literature so far mainly shows the 
short-run effects of trade cost reduction by ignoring market entry. In contrast, we show a more 
long-run effect of trade cost reduction by considering the effects of trade cost on the entry of 
domestic firms. Moreover, we address this issue under both perfectly competitive and imperfectly 
competitive domestic labour markets, thus showing the importance of the labour market structure. 
The possibility of welfare loss from international trade in a Cournot oligopoly has been 
pointed out by Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983) in the segmented markets, and by 
Markusen (1981) in the case of integrated markets. Brander (1981) shows that there are welfare 
gains from bilateral transportation cost reduction if the transport costs are sufficiently low, but there 
are welfare losses from transportation cost reduction if the transport costs are close to the 
prohibitive level. Brander and Krugman (1983) confirm the result of Brander (1981) with general 
demand functions, and also show that bilateral transportation cost reduction always increases 
welfare compared to no trade in the presence of free entry of firms. For the case of integrated 
                                                      
1 Although Brander and Krugman (1983) discuss the implications of free entry under a competitive labour market, as 
we will discuss below, our structure and also the results differ significantly from theirs. 
  1markets, Markusen (1981) shows that bilateral free trade may affect the countries differently – the 
country with the small market gains from trade, but the country with the large market may lose 
from trade. While these papers consider the effects of bilateral trade, Cordella (1993) and Collie 
(1996) show welfare loss from unilateral trade cost reduction. Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2005) 
extend Collie (1996) and show that welfare losses from unilateral trade cost reduction may reduce 
in the presence of technology licensing. Clarke and Collie (2003) show that unilateral trade 
(compared to no trade) is beneficial under Bertrand competition.  
  Except Brander and Krugman (1983), a common feature of these works is to consider a 
given market structure, thus ignoring the effects of the trade cost on the market structure. Although 
Brander and Krugman (1983) show the implications of free entry, they consider a situation of 
reciprocal dumping and symmetric bilateral transportation cost reduction, thus ignoring the effects 
of asymmetric transportation cost reduction. Moreover, they ignore the implications of integer 
constraint on the free entry equilibrium and the effects of the input market distortion. 
The consideration of reciprocal dumping considered in Brander and Krugman (1983) may 
be more appropriate for trade between the similar countries, where the firms in both countries have 
reputation and the capability to sell their products in both the domestic and the foreign markets. 
However, the firms from developing countries are often not capable of selling their products to the 
developed countries – due to high network costs
2 and/or legal restrictions
3. The consideration of 
unilateral trade cost reduction may then be more important when we consider trade between 
developed and developing countries such as USA and India, where the latter country is improving 
economic governance to reduce the foreign firm’s international trade costs. Often the policies of 
many developing countries are also influenced by the suggestion of WTO for reducing the 
                                                      
2 As pointed out by Greaney (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004), buyer-seller networks may be important for both 
international trade and investment. A favourable network effects may allow only the developed-country firms to 
penetrate the foreign markets.  
3 It is well documented that often the firms from developing countries imitate the technologies of the developed-
country firms, and a weak patent regime in the developing countries allow the developing-country firms to produce and 
sell their products in the developing countries with the imitated technologies, while the strong patent regimes in the 
  2international trade costs. We show that the welfare effects of a unilateral trade cost reduction differ 
significantly from Brander and Krugman (1983), and the integer constraint on the free entry 
equilibrium and the input market structure also play important roles.  
The consideration of free entry of domestic firms gives us the second motivation of the 
paper. In an influential paper, Mankiw and Whinston (1986) show that free entry with scale 
economies is socially excessive in the oligopolistic markets, and this result is often referred as the 
“excess-entry” theorem.
4 Vickrey (1964), von Weizsäcker (1980), Perry (1984), and Suzumura and 
Kiyono (1987), to name a few, are other important works showing socially excessive entry in 
oligopolistic markets.
5 As Vives (1988) suggests, whether entry is excessive or insufficient is not of 
purely academic interest. In many countries, governments take actions to foster or deter entry into 
particular industries. For example, in the post-war period, preventing excessive entry was a guiding 
principle in the Japanese industrial policy (see, for example, Suzumura and Kiyono, 1987; 
Suzumura, 1995). Komiya (1975) pointed out the industries such as petrochemicals and certain 
other chemical industries with a tendency to develop excessive competition, and it appears that the 
excessive-entry theorem can justify this phenomenon. 
  More recent works are concerned about the “excess-entry” theorem and show that entry can 
be insufficient in oligopolistic markets with scale economies in the presence of vertical 
relationships (Ghosh and Morita, 2007a, b)
6, technology licensing (Mukherjee and Mukherjee, 
2008), spatial competition (Matsumura and Okamura, 2006) and external economies of scale 
(Mukherjee, 2010).  
Although the literature examining social efficiency of free entry is quite large and has 
provided several important insights, the literature has mainly focused on closed economies. 
                                                                                                                                                                               
developed countries do not allow the developing-country firms to enter the developed countries with the imitated 
technologies. See, e.g., Yang and Maskus (2009) and the references therein on this issue. 
4 Mankiw and Whinston (1986) also show the possibility of insufficient entry in the presence of integer constraint.  
5 Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Salop (1979) show that entry can be either excessive or insufficient if 
there is monopolistic competition. 
  3However, in this era of globalization, it is fair to say that the policy makers should also take into 
account the effect of foreign competition while designing competition policies. This limitation of 
the excess-entry literature motivates us to examine social efficiency of domestic entry in the 
presence of foreign competition, under both competitive and imperfectly competitive domestic 
input markets. 
  In what follows, Section 2 considers a situation where a foreign firm competes with 
symmetric domestic firms in the domestic country. The number of domestic firms is determined by 
the zero profit condition. We consider perfectly competitive labour markets in this section. The 
foreign firm’s marginal cost of production is lower than the domestic firm’s marginal costs. 
However, export by the foreign firm requires a per-unit transportation cost. Following the previous 
works (see, e.g., Brander, 1981, Brander and Krugman, 1981 and Collie, 2003), we mainly consider 
the international trade cost as a transportation cost. The consideration of transportation cost can also 
get support from the works by Hummels (1991) and Milner (2005). Milner (2005) shows that even 
if tariff barriers have been reduced in recent years, international transportation costs are still 
significant and create sufficiently large trade costs. This conclusion is echoed in Hummels (1991), 
according to whom transport costs often represent a greater barrier to trade than tariffs. The 
implications of domestic tariff on our results follow easily, and we will discuss it briefly later on. 
We derive the following results in this section. If there is no integer constraint, domestic 
welfare does not depend on the transportation cost if the products are perfect substitutes. It follows 
from our analysis that if the products are imperfect substitutes, transportation cost reduction may 
reduce domestic welfare by reducing the number of domestic firms significantly. If the trade cost 
represents domestic tariff, domestic welfare is higher under a positive non-prohibitive tariff 
compared to free trade and no trade. If there is an integer constraint, transportation cost reduction 
                                                                                                                                                                               
6  Extending Ghosh and Morita (2007a), which mainly consider bilateral bargaining between the upstream and 
downstream agents, Mukherjee (2009) shows that entry is more likely to be excessive if there is a centralized upstream 
agent. 
  4can reduce consumer surplus and increase the profits of the active domestic firms and domestic 
welfare, even if the products are homogeneous.  
While examining the issue of excessive entry, our results are as follows. If the transportation 
cost is low and the marginal costs of production of the domestic firms are sufficiently high 
compared to the marginal cost of production of the foreign firm, entry in the domestic country is 
socially insufficient instead of excessive.
7 In this situation, the anti-competitive entry-regulation in 
the domestic country may not be justified. 
If the domestic labour market is perfectly competitive, trade cost reduction does not affect 
the marginal costs of production of the domestic firms. However, in the presence of a domestic 
labour union, trade cost reduction can affect the marginal costs of production of the domestic firms 
by affecting the domestic wage, which may have important welfare implications. Further, the 
domestic wage effect may also have important implications for the social efficiency of domestic 
entry. Section 3 focuses on this issue by considering a domestic labour union that sets the domestic 
wage strategically. We show in this section that a transportation cost reduction reduces domestic 
welfare in the free entry equilibrium with no integer constraint and homogeneous products. If the 
transportation cost reduction does not affect the number of domestic firms significantly, which may 
be due to the integer constraint, a lower transportation cost may increase domestic welfare. We also 
show that entry is always socially insufficient for the domestic country. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The case of perfectly competitive labour markets 
Assume that there is a foreign firm, firm 1, which has invented a technology and wants to sell the 
product in another country, called domestic country. There is large number of firms in the domestic 
country. The domestic firms get the technical know-how of the foreign technology through 
knowledge spillover, and decide whether to enter the industry. We consider free entry in the 
  5domestic country, where entry requires a fixed entry cost 
2 K . The entry cost can be viewed as a 
fixed investment or the opportunity cost of entering the industry. The number of domestic firms 
entering the industry is determined endogenously by the zero profit condition. Entry in the domestic 
country occurs until the net positive profit of a domestic entrant is positive. For analytical 
simplicity, we will mainly ignore integer constraint and will consider the number of domestic firms 
as a continuous variable. However, we will also discuss the implications of integer constraint.  
The firms produce a homogeneous product and compete like Cournot oligopolists in the 
domestic country. We assume that firm 1’s marginal cost of production is constant, and it is 
normalized to 0 for simplicity. However, exporting by firm 1 requires a per-unit trade cost, t, as the 
transportation cost. Hence, the total marginal cost of firm 1 is t, which includes its marginal cost of 
production and the transportation cost. The constant marginal cost of production of each domestic 
firm is c. The constant marginal costs of production of the foreign and the domestic firms imply that 
the foreign and the domestic labour markets are perfectly competitive and the transportation cost 
does not affect the marginal costs of production of the firms. Assuming that production requires 
only labour, we can normalize the labour coefficient of the foreign firm to zero to normalize its 
marginal cost of production equal to zero. However, assuming the labour coefficient of each 
domestic firm as one, we can then view c as the competitive wage in the domestic country. The 
higher labour coefficients of the domestic firms compared to the foreign firm may represent 
imperfect knowledge spillover. 
Assume that the inverse market demand function is 
  ,                               (1)  q a P − =
where P is price and q is the total output sold. 
  We consider the following game. At stage 1, conditional on the transportation cost, the 
domestic firms decide whether to enter the industry. At stage 2, the firms compete like Cournot 
                                                                                                                                                                               
7 In order to compare our results with the previous works on “excessive entry”, we ignore the integer constraint while 
looking at the social efficiency of domestic entry. It follows from Mankiw and Whinston (1986) that entry can be 
  6duopolists in the domestic country. If no domestic firm enters the industry, the foreign firm sells to 
the domestic country as a monopolist. We solve the game through backward induction.  
If n domestic firms enter the industry, the equilibrium output and profit of firm 1 can be 
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The equilibrium outputs of all active domestic firms are positive for any transportation cost if 
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2.1. The welfare effects of a lower transportation cost 
It is immediate from (3) that as t falls, it reduces the equilibrium number of domestic firms. This is 
intuitive. A lower transportation cost makes the foreign firm more competitive, thus reducing entry 
in the domestic country.  
The total output in the free entry equilibrium (i.e., the sum of all domestic firms’ outputs and 







= + = ∑
+
= n




i  or 
                                                                                                                                                                               
socially insufficient even in a closed economy in the presence of integer constraint. 
  7K c a q − − = ,                              (4) 
which is independent of t. 
At the free entry equilibrium, the gross profit of each domestic entrant is  , which is 
independent of t. However, it does not imply immediately that the output of a domestic entrant will 
be the same irrespective of the transportation cost. The reason for this result can be found from 
McGuire and Ohta (2005), and it will be clear from the intuition that this result would hold even for 
some more general demand functions than the one considered here. At the free entry equilibrium, 
the tangency between the marginal domestic entrant’s residual demand curve and its average cost 
determines the price of the product and the equilibrium output of each symmetric domestic entrant. 
If the market demand curve is such that a change in competitors’ outputs leave the slopes of the 
domestic entrants’ residual demand curves unaffected (as happens under linear demand), a change 
in the transportation cost neither affects the average cost of the domestic entrants nor affects the 
slopes of the domestic entrants’ residual demands. Hence, a change in the transportation cost does 
not affect the tangency point between the marginal domestic entrant’s residual demand and its 
average cost curve, thus creating no effect on the equilibrium price and outputs of the symmetric 
domestic entrants. 
2 K
  An interesting implication of the above discussion is that, under free entry in the domestic 
country where the equilibrium number of domestic firms is determined by the zero profit condition, 
the transportation cost does not affect the consumers. Since the total net profits of the domestic 
firms, which are zero, and the total outputs (and therefore, consumer surplus) do not depend on the 
transportation cost, the following result is immediate. 
  
Proposition 1: If the firms produce homogeneous products, there is no integer constraint and 
domestic free entry determines the equilibrium number of domestic firms through the zero profit 
condition, domestic welfare does not depend on the transportation cost. 
  8 
  Proposition 1 is in contrast to the previous works considering given market structures, thus 
focusing on the short-run effects of a transportation cost reduction. Our result suggests that, in the 
long-run, where the transportation cost affects domestic entry, a unilateral transportation cost 
reduction does not affect domestic welfare in a Cournot oligopoly. Proposition 1, which considers a 
unilateral transportation cost reduction, is also in contrast to the result of Brander and Krugman 
(1983) under free entry, which shows that a bilateral transportation cost reduction increases welfare. 
 
2.2. Discussions 
Some comments are in order following the above analysis. 
 
2.2.1. The importance of integer constraint 
We have seen in (3) that as t reduces, it reduces entry in the domestic country. Now we want to see 
the difference in the number of active domestic firms under prohibitive transportation cost and free 
trade. This will give us the maximum difference in the equilibrium number of domestic firms, since, 
as t falls   reduces continuously. The equilibrium number of domestic firms under prohibitive 








= =+ = − , which is equal to the total number of active firms 
in this situation. On the other hand, if there is free trade, i.e., t = 0, the equilibrium number of 






== − −. Therefore, the maximum possible difference in the 
equilibrium number of domestic firms is 
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c
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= =+ − = =+ , and this is higher 
(lower) than 2 if  . It is then immediate that if  () c ><K 0 c = , the maximum possible difference in 
the equilibrium number of domestic firms is 1. 
  9While it may be easy to visualize c < K, i.e., the marginal costs of production of the 
domestic firms are lower than the entry costs, it may not be difficult also to think of c > K, if we 
consider that K represents alternative investment opportunities of the domestic firms or the 
disutility of entering to this industry. For example, if the profits of the domestic firms from 
alternative businesses are negligible, which they need to sacrifice in order to enter this industry, we 
get that K is close to zero, thus satisfying c > K. Alternatively, if the domestic firms want to enter 
this industry, they may not need to switch from their other business, but may need to incur 
with 





additional costs for monitoring and coordinating different businesses, which implies K > 0. 
However, if this adjustment cost is small, we can have the situation of c > K.    
  The above discussion makes the consideration of the integer constraint important, and the 
following argument will show that,  integer constraint, transportation cost reduction may hurt 
the consumers, benefit the active domestic firms and increase domestic welfare.
8 To show it in the 
simplest way, consider the case of cK < . If we have considered the firms as integers, it follows 
from the above discussion that the maximum difference in the equilibrium number of domestic 
firms is 1 if cK < . Since there are only domestic firm
 that the total number of active firms (i.e., the foreign firm plus all the active domestic firms) 
can be the same under different transportation costs.  
Assume that, under a prohibitive transportat n cost, the equilibrium number of domestic 
firms is an integer 
* n . If the transportation cost falls, the foreign firm starts exporting to the 
ic country, which reduces  e profits of the 
* n  domestic firms. Hence, if the transportation 
cost is lower than the prohibitive transportation cost, the equilibrium number of domestic firms is 
* (1 ) n − , since the net profits of 
* n  domestic firms are zero under prohibitive transportation cost. 
That is, if the transportation cost is slightly lower than the prohibitive transportation cost, one 
 firm with the marginal cost c will leave the market and the foreign firm with the marginal 
  10cost  t will replace this domestic firm. Since the prohibitive transportation cost implies that 
tcK =+ , a slight reduction of the transportation cost from the prohibitive level implies that t > c. 
This implies that a transportation cost reduction replaces a domestic firm with a lower marginal cost 
by the foreign firm with a higher m  cost. Hence, the total outputs and the consumer surplus 
reduce following a slight transportation cost reduction from the prohibitive level. However, due to 
the integer constraint, each of the 
* (1 ) n
arginal
−  domestic entrants can now enjoy a net positive profit. 
mer surplus loss, which is more 
appen if , and ma estic welfare.  
tegers, transportation cost reduction may reduce 




These net profit gains of the domestic firms may outweigh the consu
likely to h
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  The above discussion is summarized in the following result. 
 
Proposition 2: If we consider the firms as in
c
replacing a domestic firm with the fo
 
2.2.2. Trade cost as domestic tariff 
Now ignore the integer constraint but consider the trade cost as domestic tariff. Note that, whether 
the trade cost represents transportation cost or domestic tariff does not make any difference to the 
equilibrium number of domestic reign firm’s output, the total output, net domestic 
profits and consumer surplus. Howe if the st is domestic tariff, the tariff revenue at the 
free entry equilibrium, which is  () Tt cKt =+ −  adds a new term to the domestic welfare. Since the 
tariff revenue is positive between  0 t =  and tcK = + estic welfare is higher for any tariff 




hibit to both free trade and no trade. Since the tariff 
venue is concave with respect
nd pro ive p
 to t over  0 t
 tariff com
=  and tcK = + re , domestic welfare is also concave over 
                                                                                                                                                                              
this range of tariff.  
 
8 Considering a closed economy, Kabiraj and Marjit (1992) show in a different context that a marginal cost reduction 
  11 
2.2.3. The implications of imperfect substitutes and Bertrand competition 
We have considered homogeneous products and have shown that if the transportation cost 
represents trade cost, a lower transportation cost does not affect domestic welfare if we ignore the 
integer constraint. It follows easily from our intuition that if the firms produce imperfect substitutes 
and the slopes of the firms’ residual demand curves do not depend on the competitors’ outputs and 
the number of varieties, a lower transportation cost may reduce domestic welfare. If the slopes of 
the firms’ residual demand curves do not depend on the competitors’ outputs and the number of 
varieties, the equilibrium price and the total outputs do not depend on the transportation cost. 
However, a lower transportation cost reduces the number of domestic firms. If the loss of domestic 
firms i
fits of the domestic firms are zero, 
is loss of varieties can reduce consumer surplus and domestic welfare following a transportation 
and Collie (2003).  
                                                                                                                                                                              
s more than 1, a lower transportation cost reduces the total number of active firms and the 
number of varieties, thus reducing domestic welfare.  
It also follows from the above argument that a unilateral transportation cost reduction may 
also reduce domestic welfare if the firms compete like Bertrand oligopolists with imperfect 
substitutes. For example, ignore the integer constraint. As in the case of Cournot competition, a 
lower transportation cost reduces the equilibrium number of domestic firms also under Bertrand 
competition by increasing the competitiveness of the foreign firm. Hence, the foreign firm replaces 
domestic firms. If the reduction in the domestic firms is more than 1, the total number of active 
firms and therefore, the total number of varieties reduce following a reduction in the transportation 
cost. Since, in the absence of an integer constraint, the net pro
th
cost reduction. This is in contrast to Clarke 
 
2.3. Socially excessive or insufficient entry 
 
in a firm may increase the price of a product by inducing exit of firms in the presence of scale economies. 
  12Even if domestic welfare is not influenced by the transportation cost as shown in Proposition 1, 
domestic country can influence its welfare by designing an appropriate competition policy, which 
affects the number of firms entering the domestic industry. Now we look at this issue and determine 
the welfare maximizing number of domestic firms. As usual (see, Mankiw and Whinston, 1986), we 
assume that the domestic government can only control the number of domestic firms entering the 
industry, but cannot influence the domestic firms’ strategic behaviour. We will consider that the 
mest
lly excessive in a closed 
econom
ow that, in the presence of foreign competition, insufficient 
ay occur under Cournot competition with homogeneous products. 
For a given t, domestic welfare maximizing number of domestic firms, n, is found by 
 
do ic firms compete like Cournot oligopolists with homogeneous products. The following 
analysis will show that entry can be socially insufficient or excessive for the domestic country 
depending on the transportation cost. 
  It follows from Mankiw and Whinston (1986) that entry is socia
y under Cournot competition, homogeneous products and no integer constraint. We ignore 
integer constraint in this section to sh
entry m
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Domestic welfare maximizing number of n is the solution of the following first order condition: 
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estic country is excessive (insufficient) if left hand side (LHS) of (6) is negative 
(positive) at the free entry equilibrium number of firms shown in (3). Using (3) in the LHS of (6), 
we get 
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* 2 n > , which occurs if the cost of entry is not very 
high (see (3)). 
c < 
  The above discussion is summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: Consider 
*
tt < , 
2
excessive (insufficient) for 
a
c <  and no integer constraint. Entry in the domestic country is 
* * (,) tt t ∈  (
* [0, ) tt < ). However, the condition for insufficient entry can 
be satisfied provided 
* 2 n >  and  (, )
2
a
cc ∈  . 
 
  Proposition 3 shows that entry in the domestic country can be socially insufficient in the 
presence of foreign competition. Hence, the anti-competitive entry regulation policies suggested by 
the “excess-entry” theorem focusing on closed economies may not be justifiable in open economies. 
  
  The intuition for insufficient entry is as follows. It is clear from the closed economy analysis 
, the first 
effect does not play any role, and the second effect creates socially excessive entry. 
of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) that, on the one hand, free entry tends to increase social welfare 
through its gross profit, but, on the other hand, entry tends to reduce social welfare by contracting 
outputs of all the existing firms due to the business stealing effect. At the free entry equilibrium, the 
gross profits of all firms are equal to the entry costs. Hence, at the free entry equilibrium
  14  However, if all the firms are not from the same country, as we consider here, entry also 
creates a rent extraction effect. As the number of domestic firms increases, it extracts more rents 
from the foreign firm, which creates a positive effect on the domestic welfare. This rent extraction 
effect under an open economy may create insufficient entry for the domestic country.  
  Rent extraction by the domestic firms from the foreign firm depends on the marginal cost 
difference between the firms and on the transportation cost. If either the marginal cost difference 
between the foreign and the domestic firms is large and the transportation cost is very small, rent 
extraction from the foreign firm is small, which creates the domestic country’s incentive for having 
a large number of domestic firms, while lower competitiveness of the domestic firms reduces their 
It must be clear that if the trade cost means domestic tariff, insufficient entry in the domestic 
e tariff revenue and the total 
                                                     
incentives for entry. Hence, entry can be insufficient for the domestic country if the transportation 
cost is small and the foreign firm’s marginal cost is sufficiently low compared to the marginal costs 
of the domestic firms. Otherwise, the business stealing effect dominates the rent extraction effect, 
and makes domestic entry socially excessive.
9 
 
country can hold, since Proposition 3 holds under free trade. Since th
cost due to transportation are zero under free trade, Proposition 3 will be the same under free trade, 
irrespective of the way we measure the trade cost. 
  
3. The case of an imperfectly competitive domestic labour market 
So far we have considered perfectly competitive labour markets and therefore, trade cost reduction 
does not affect the marginal costs of production of the firms. The constant marginal cost of 
production of the domestic firms means that trade cost reduction does not affect the average costs of 
the domestic firms, which play an important role for Proposition 1. However, if the domestic labour 
 
9 In an independent work, Lim (2010) examines the excess-entry theorem in the presence of foreign competition and 
domestic tariff and VER. In contrast, we focus on the transportation cost, and ignore the effect of the tariff revenue. 
Further, unlike Lim (2010), we consider in the following section the effects of labour market distortion. Lim (2010) 
also does not consider the welfare effects of trade cost reduction, which is another focus of our paper.  
  15market is imperfectly competitive, may be due to the existence of a labour union, trade cost 
reduction not only reduces the total marginal cost of the foreign firm (which include its marginal 
cost of production and the trade cost), it can also affect the marginal costs of production of the 
domestic firms by affecting the wage charged by the union. Hence, trade cost reduction affects the 
average costs of the domestic firms. We address this issue here. In contrast to Section 2, we will 
nd to show 
y competitive. 
 
e their outputs simultaneously and 
e solve the game through backward induction. 
We consider that the trade cost represents transportation cost. If n domestic firms have 
quilibrium outpu
 
show that even if there is no integer constraint and the products are perfect substitutes, a 
transportation cost reduction reduces domestic welfare, thus showing the importance of the 
domestic labour market structure. We will also argue that a lower transportation cost may increase 
domestic welfare in the presence of integer constraint. 
  We assume that there is a labour union in the domestic country, which charges a uniform 
wage to all domestic firms. We consider the right-to-manage model of labour union,
10 a
the effects of labour union in the simplest way, we assume that the union has full bargaining power. 
We consider that production requires only workers and every domestic firm requires one labour to 
produce one unit of output.  Further, we normalize the reservation wage of the domestic workers to 
zero. Like Section 2, we assume that the foreign labour market is perfectl
We consider the following game in this section. At stage 1, the domestic firms decide 
whether to enter the industry. Conditional on the number of domestic firms entering the industry, at 
stage 2, the union charges the wage. At stage 3, all firms choos
the profits are realized. W
entered the industry and the domestic wage is w, the e t of firm 1 and the ith 





















                                                     
.                    (9) 
 
10 We refer to Lommerud et al. (2003), López and Naylor (2004) and Mukherjee (2008), to name a few, for works on the right-to-
manage model of labour unions. 










. The domestic union 
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The equilibrium wage can be found as 
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at +
= w , which shows that domestic wage and the 
ansportation cost ar ositiv y rela d.  tr e p el te
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  Since the net profits o zero and the trade cost represents 
n
K
=− .                                     (11) 
f all the domestic firms are 
transportation cost, social welfare is given by the sum of union utility and consumer surplus. The 
total equilibrium output at the free entry equilibrium is 
















+ ∑ . 
























Welfare at the free entry equilibrium is 
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We get that 
an t n nn at
W
+− + + + +
= .                 (12) 
** 54 Wa t K ∂+ −
= . Assuming that at least one domestic firm always enters the
16 t ∂
 






, i.e., a 
  17transportation cost reduction reduces domestic welfare in the free entry equilibrium. The reason for 
this result will be clear once we look at the effects of t on wage, domestic employment and output. 





=  and it does not depend r 
of final goods producers, which is in line with Greenhut and Ohta (1976) and Dhillon and Petrakis 
(2002), but holds even under foreign competition. However, a lo
 on the numbe
wer transportation cost reduces the 
equilibrium domestic wage by creating higher competition for the domestic firms. 
  The total domestic labour demand at the free entry equilibrium, which is 






also reduces with a lower transportation cost. Hence, a lower transportation cost reduces domestic 
employment and the union utility at the free entry equilibrium.  
Now look at the effect of a transportation cost reduction on the total output at the free entry 
equilibrium, which has a positive relationship with consumer surplus. The total output at the free 
entry equilibrium is 
** 34 aK t
q
−−
= , which increases with a lower transport
4
ation cost. Hence, 
transportation cost reduction increases consumer surplus at the free entry equilibrium. 
Our result shows that, if there is at least one domestic firm entering the industry, the effect 
of transportation cost reduction on union utility dominates the effect of the consumer surplus, and a 
We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition. 
union utility and domestic welfare but benefits the 
consumer at the free entry equilibrium with
lower transportation cost reduces domestic welfare at the free entry equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 4: If there is a domestic labour union and at least one domestic firm always enters the 
industry, a lower transportation cost reduces 
 homogeneous products and no integer constraint. 
 
  18  Proposition 3 is in contrast to Proposition 1, and shows that even if we ignore the integer 
constraints, transportation cost reduction can affect the consumers and domestic welfare in the 
presence of input market distortion. 
It must be noted that, due to the zero profit condition, lower domestic wage following 
transportation cost reduction does not affect the net profits of the domestic firms. However, if there 
is an integer constraint, and free entry in the domestic country does not reduce the net profits of the 
domestic firms to zero, transportation cost reduction, even if reduces the number of firms (which 
llows
t is significant and the transportation cost reduction does not 
ber of domestic firms, it can be shown easily that transportation cost reduction may 
increase domestic welfare.
11 
sufficient in the presence of domestic labour union and foreign competition. Again, we ignore the 
s is determ
maximizing the following expression: 
 
fo  from (11)), helps the domestic active firms by reducing their wage, thus increasing their net 
profits. This positive effect of transportation cost reduction on the domestic net profits may help to 
eliminate (or at least reduce) the negative effects of transportation cost reduction on domestic 
welfare. In fact, if the integer constrain
affect the num
  Finally, we want to see whether entry in the domestic country is socially excessive or 
in
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Domestic welfare maximizing number of domestic firms is determined from the following expression: 
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 can be negative for lower t and lower n, which occurs for a sufficiently large 
cost of entry (see (11)). 
( 4)[ ( 4) (5 4)] n a n t n ∂+ − + +
  19Evaluating (14) at the free entry equilibrium number of firms, thus considering 
** nn = , we get that LHS of 
(14) is 
2(1 2 3 ) Ka K t +−
, which is positive, since the requirement for positive output of
2( ) at +
 firm 1 at the 
ee en
c country is always insufficient 
lt confirms Ghosh and Morita (2007b) in open economies. 
If there is a domestic labour union, its strategic wage determination creates a wage effect 
at affects domestic welfare along with the effects mentioned for Proposition 3. The market power 
f the labour union creates the market wage higher than the reservation wage of the workers, thus 
uble marginalization” problem. The distortion created by the union power increases 
 
 
fr try equilibrium implies  43 0 aKt +− > . Hence, it implies that domestic welfare at the free 
entry equilibrium is increasing with respect to the number of domestic firms, which gives the 
following proposition immediately. 
 
Proposition 5: Consider no integer constraint. Entry in the domesti
for the domestic country in the presence of a domestic labour union. 
 
  We have assumed in this section that the labour union has full bargaining power. This is 
opposite to Section 2 where the labour market is perfectly competitive, which is equivalent to the 
case where the labour union has no bargaining power. Hence, the comparison of Proposition 5 with 






the domestic government’s incentive for attracting more domestic firms, and makes insufficient 




  20This paper focuses on two aspects. First, it shows the welfare effects of trade cost reduction in the 
presence of free domestic entry. Second, it shows the social efficiency of domestic entry in the 
presence of foreign competition. We examine these issues under perfectly competitive and 
imperfectly competitive domestic labour markets. 
  If the labour market is perfectly competitive, we show that if we ignore the integer 
constraint and the trade cost represents transportation cost, trade cost does not affect the domestic 
welfare if the products are homogeneous. However, if the products are imperfect substitutes, 
transportation cost reduction may reduce welfare by reducing the number of domestic firms. If the 
trade c
s products.   
is always socially insufficient. Domestic input market distortion increases the 
ost represents domestic tariff, domestic welfare is higher under a positive non-prohibitive 
tariff compared to both free trade and no trade. With integer constraint, transportation cost 
reduction may reduce consumer surplus and increase the profits of the active domestic firms and 
domestic welfare with homogeneou
If the domestic labour market is distorted due to the presence of a labour union, we show 
that a lower transportation cost reduces domestic welfare with homogeneous products and no 
integer constraint. However, a lower transportation cost may increase domestic welfare in the 
presence of an integer constraint.  
  While examining the issue of excessive entry, we show that if the labour market is perfectly 
competitive, the transportation cost is not very high and the marginal cost of the domestic firm is 
sufficiently higher than the marginal cost of the foreign firm, entry in the domestic country is 
insufficient for the domestic country. In the presence of a domestic labour union, entry in the 
domestic country 
possibility of insufficient entry in the domestic country. Hence, the anti-competitive entry-
regulation may not be justified for the domestic country under foreign competition and, it may 
depend on the trade cost, the marginal cost difference between the firms and the domestic input 
market structure. 
  21  Endogenous domestic market structure in our analysis provides some interesting new 
insights to the two strands of the literature – on the welfare effects of trade cost reduction and on 
the excessive-entry theorem. Although we have considered free entry in the domestic market, we 
have considered the foreign firm as a technology leader. Hence, the number of foreign firm is 
exogenous in our analysis. It is implicit in our analysis that patent protection in the foreign country 
reates significant entry barrier in the foreign country, while weak patent protection in the domestic 
ountry allows domestic entry. This assumption helps us to show the implications of endogenous 
omestic market structure in the simplest way. However, a natural extension of this analysis is to 
onsider free entry also in the foreign country, either due to a weak patent protection or due to 
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